We Need to Help the Sunnis

I did not say that but Michael O'Hanlon of Brookings did - and he actually makes sense. In addition to federalism the split of oil revenues promises to harm the Sunni population. Since most of the wells are either in Kurd and Shiite territory they intend to hold on to what they make. O'Hanlon makes the credible case that the oil belongs to the Iraqi people and should be shared. I don't think that this will fix the problem short-term, but it forms a good basis for the future.

We're Too Nice

Dick Cheney's favorite historian and mine, (I personally think Cheney didn't read closely enough), Victor Davis Hanson, says that we might be to soft to fight and win the GWOT (Global War on Terror). He might be right.

Praise be to Allah it Failed

Pakistani hotheads not happy about the talks with Israel decided to hold rallies at home. Fortunately for all concerned they "fizzled." Pakistani PM Shaukat Aziz said they only met with the Israelis at the request of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.

EUnuchs Warn Iran

The EUnuchs are warning Iran to talk or else they'll tell their mommies. Actually they said that they would tell the UN. So what should concern the Iranians? That the EUnuchs will attack? That's too funny to contemplate and Schroeder would not stand for it. That they won't buy their oil? Don't be silly. If I was a mad mullah sitting in Tehran I probably would not be losing sleep over this.

Cats and Dogs Living Together

The French and the Americans are going to work together to push for democracy in the Mid East - at least that is what the WashTimes is saying. The WashPost echoes the theme noting that the French and the Americans are putting pressure on Syria to leave Lebanon alone.

The Conservative (UK) - Republican Crack-Up?

Kenneth Clarke, who could either become the leader of the Tories or the Harold Stassen of British politics, has criticized Blair and Bush over Iraq. If Clarke should come out on top this could put a strain in relations between Republicans and Tories. This is shocking of course due to the close relationship that they have nurtured since the days of Ronnie and Maggie.

Muslim Brotherhood and the Elections in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood, the group that spawned radical Islamism (see Sayyid Qutb), is playing a role in the elections. Egypt won't let them run candidates but they opted to encourage people to vote. Though they did not endorse a candidate they hinted that they are not Hosni fans.

4 Suspects in Lebanon Charged

Four of the five suspects handed over by the UN to Lebanese prosecuters have been charged:

The four suspects, Mustafa Hamdan, commander of Lebanon's Republican Guard; Jamil al-Sayyed, Lebanon's former head of general security; Ali Hajj, former chief of the Lebanese police; and Raymond Azar, a former military intelligence chief, were charged with murder, attempted murder and carrying out a terrorist act. The men, once feared as Syria's proxies in Lebanon, are expected to face a Lebanese investigative judge on Friday.

The American Interest is Online

The debut issue of The American Interest is now up on its site. If you want to read anything more than excerpts, however, it will set you back $39. In a bit of non-sensical marketing the online version costs the same as the print version and if buy one you don't automatically get the other. You have to fork over $69 for an annual subscription to both.

The new foreign policy journal is pulling out all its big guns to get this thing started. Gracing its cover (yes it has a cover with something more than article titles) is Condi. Inside we get an interview of Condi by the editor of TAI, Adam Garfinkle, who also worked for her at the NSC. Also featured are short articles by practically everyone on its admittedly stellar editorial board including Eliot Cohen, Anne Applebaum, Walter Russell Mead, Glenn C. Loury, James Q. Wilson, Frances Fukuyama and several others. Zbigniew Brzezinski has a longer piece in the issue. What passes for a mission statement is published in full and is credited to Fukuyama, Brzezinski, Cohen and the token European Josef Joffre.

By the way TAI also has a blog, AI...cont'd, that is also up and running.

Kaplan on Laboratories of Counterinsurgency

Robert Kaplan's new book, Imperial Grunts, comes out next week and The Atlantic Monthly has published an extensive excerpt (subscription required). Kaplan sets the tone immediately:

America is waging a counterinsurgency campaign not just in Iraq but against Islamic terror groups throughout the world. Counterinsurgency falls into two categories: unconventional war (UW in Special Operations lingo) and direct action (DA). Unconventional war, though it sounds sinister, actually represents the soft, humanitarian side of counterinsurgency: how to win without firing a shot. For example, it may include relief activities that generate good will among indigenous populations, which in turn produces actionable intelligence. Direct action represents more-traditional military operations. In 2003 I spent a summer in the southern Philippines and an autumn in eastern and southern Afghanistan, observing how the U.S. military was conducting these two types of counterinsurgency.

In the Philipines among other things Green Beret detachments chose to be located in Abu Sayyaf strongholds - scattering the Islamist group and allowing humanitarian work to continue unimpeded:

The ostensible mission was to help Filipino troops kill or capture international terrorists. That was accomplished by orchestrating a humanitarian assistance campaign, which severed the link between the terrorists and the rest of the Muslim population: exactly what successful middle-level U.S. commanders had done in the Philippines a hundred years before. "We changed the way we were perceived," a Green Beret told me. "When we arrived in Basilan, Muslim kids made throat-slashing gestures at us. By the time we left, they were our friends. That led them to question everything the guerrillas had told themabout Americans."

The success of the mission can teach us important lessons:

The most crucial tactical lesson of the Philippines war is that the smaller the unit, and the farther forward it is deployed among the indigenous population, the more it can accomplish. This is a lesson that turns imperial overstretch on its head. Though one big deployment like that in Iraq can overstretch our military, deployments in many dozens of countries involving relatively small numbers of highly trained people will not.

But the Basilan intervention is more pertinent as a model for future operations elsewhere than for what it finally achieved. For example, if he United States and Pakistan are ever to pacify the radicalized tribal agencies of the Afghan-Pakistani borderlands, it will have to be through a variation on how Special Forces operated in Basilan; direct action alone willnot be enough.

Moreover, as free societies gain ground around the world, the U.S. military is going to be increasingly restricted in terms of how it operates. An age of democracy means an age of frustratingly narrow rules of engagement. That is because fledgling democratic governments, besieged by young and aggressive local media, will find it politically difficult—if notimpossible—to allow American troops on their soil to engage in direct action.

Iraq and Afghanistan are rare examples where restrictive rules of engagement do not apply. But in most other cases U.S. troops will be deployed to bolster democratic governments rather than to topple authoritarian ones. Therefore unconventional warfare in the Philippines provides a better guidepost for our military than direct action in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan Kaplan tries to understand what makes some of these soldiers tick and how they dealt with their situation:

Holiday, who had just turned forty, seemed the most clean-cut of the fort's inhabitants. A civil engineer with a master's degree from the University of South Florida, and the father of three small children, he was chatty, well-spoken, and intense. "God has put me here," he told me matter-of-factly. "I'm a Christian"—he meant an evangelical. "The best kind of moral leader is one who is invisible. I believe character is more important than education. I have noticed that people who are highly educated and sophisticated do not like to take risks. But God can help someone who is highly educated to take big risks."

Holiday had served in the 82nd Airborne before returning to civilian life and then joining Special Forces as a Florida National Guardsman. His long months of Guard duty did not please his private employer, so he left his job and went to work as a civil engineer for the state. "You see all this around you?" he asked, eyeing the dust, engine grease, and mud-brick walls. "Well, it's the high point of my military life and of everyone else here."

"What about the beards?" I asked.

Holiday smiled, deliberately rubbing his chin. "The other day I had a meeting at the provincial governor's office. All these notables came in and rubbed their beards against mine, a sign of endearment and respect. I simply could not get my message across in these meetings unless I made some accommodations with the local culture and values. Afghanistan is not like other countries. It's a throwback. You've got to compromise and go native a little."

"Another thing," he went on. "Ever since 5th Group was here, in '01, Afghans have learned not to tangle with the bearded Americans. Afghanistan needs more SF, less conventional troops, but it's not that easy, because SF is already overstretched in its deployments."

Kaplan also voices the frustration felt by many serving in Afghanistan:

The essence of military "transformation"—the Washington buzzword of recent years—is not new tactics or even weapons systems but bureaucratic reorganization. In fact, such reorganization was achieved in the weeks following 9/11 by the 5th Special Forces Group, based in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, whose handful of A teams (with help from the CIA, Air Force Special Ops embeds, and others) conquered Afghanistan.

The relationship between 5th Group and the highest levels of Pentagon officialdom had, in those precious, historic weeks of the fall of 2001, evinced the organizational structure that distinguished al-Qaeda and also the most innovative global corporations. It was an arrangement with which the finest business schools and management consultants would have been impressed. The captains and team sergeants of the various 5th Group A teams did not communicate with the top brass through an extended, vertical chain of command. They weren't even given specific instructions. They were just told to link up with the indigs—the Northern Alliance and also friendly Pashtoons—and help them defeat the Taliban. And to figure out the details as they went along.

The result was the empowerment of master sergeants to call in B-52 strikes. Fifth Group was no longer a small part of an enormous defense bureaucracy. It became a veritable corporate spinoff, commissioned to do a specific job its very own way, in the manner of a top consultant. But as time went on, that operating procedure came to an end. Now what had previously been approved orally within minutes took three days of paperwork, with bureaucratic layers of lieutenant colonels and senior officers delaying operations and diluting them of risk. When hits finally took place, they more than likely turned up dry holes. One of the basic laws of counterinsurgency warfare, established in the Marines' Small Wars Manual (1940) and the British Colonel C. E. Callwell's Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice (1896), was being ignored: Get out of the compound and out among the local people, preferably in small numbers. Yet the CJTF-180 in Bagram, by demanding forms and orders for almost every excursion outside the firebase, acted as a restraint on its Special Forces troops, whose whole purpose was to fight unconventionally in "small wars" style.

There was no scandal here, no one specifically to blame. It was just the way Big Army—that is, big government, that is, Washington—always did things. It was standard Washington "pile on." Every part of the military wanted a piece of Afghanistan, and that led to bureaucratic overkill.

"Big Army just doesn't get it," Custer said, like a persevering parent dealing with the antics of a child. "It doesn't get the beards, the ball caps, the windows rolled down so that we can shake hands with the hajis and hand out PowerBars to the kids. Big Army has regulations against all of that. Big Army doesn't understand that before you can subvert a people you've got to love them, and love their culture." (In fact, one reason that some high-ranking officers in the regular Army hated the beards was that they brought back bad memories of the indiscipline of the Vietnam-era Army.)

"Army people are systems people," he went on. "They think the system is going to protect them. Green Berets don't trust the system. We know the Kevlar helmets may not
stop a 7.62mm round. So we wear ball caps—they're more comfortable. When you see a gunner atop an up-armor, bouncing up and down in the dust, breaking his vertebrae almost, let him wear a ball cap and he's happy. His morale is high because simply by wearing that ball cap he's convinced himself that he's fucking the system.

"Maybe in the future we'll be incorporated into a new and reformed CIA, rather than into Big Army. Any bureaucracy that is interested in results more than in regulations will be an improvement. You see, I can say these things—I'm a Guardsman."

He closes by stressing the shortsightedness of "Big Army":

Several years into the war on terrorism, one would think that Pashto would be commonly spoken, at least on a basic level, by American troops in these borderlands. It isn't. Nor are Farsi and Urdu—the languages of Iran and the tribal agencies of Pakistan, where U.S. Special Operations forces are likely to be active, in one way or another, over the coming decade. Like Big Army's aversion to beards, the lack of linguistic preparedness demonstrates that the Pentagon bureaucracy pays too little attention to the most basic tool of counterinsurgency: adaptation to the cultural terrain. It is such adaptation—more than new weapons systems or an ideological commitment to Western democracy—that will deliver us from quagmires.

Iran's New Prez Downplays Past

No one denies that Iran's new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was an important student leader (subscription required) during the takeover of the US embassy what is interesting is that he is so quiet about his involvement. Mark Bowden (Black Hawk Down, Killing Pablo) currently writing a book on the '79 embassy takeover in Tehran thinks he knows why:

Ahmadinejad's prompt disavowal was a tacit acknowledgment that today the episode comes with distinct political liabilities, both foreign and domestic. Why would an association with the embassy takeover hurt Ahmadinejad? Because the hostage crisis resulted in such profound and lasting misfortune in Iran. Many Iranians (including Asgharzadeh) now regard it as an enormous blunder. Iranian conspiracy theorists on both the left and the right take solace in the preposterous notion that the whole thing was really planned by the CIA, which would make the students at best dupes, and at worst hirelings, of the Great Satan. In the eyes of the world, the takeover has damaged Iran's standing. It was a crime against international diplomacy, an age-old system that exists to resolve problems between nations peacefully. As Iran's new president, Ahmadinejad will be the most visible symbol of Iran in the world.

Hugo Latin American Mac Daddy

Writing in Slate Alexandra Starr talks about Hugo Chavez's growing influence in Latin America (I would have included the Caribbean). We've covered a great deal of it here but she adds some analysis. She touches on Hugo's Bolivarian delusion and the fact that Chavez's actions have forced us to pay more attention to LA. As she correctly notes however we have blundered badly in focusing on the anti-Hugo angle. L.A.'s aren't fools (well some of them aren't) they know what Chavez is about - they don't need visits from Rumsfeld telling them how scary he is. They need us to help the issues that threaten their stability and better trade relations.

Homeland Security and Katrina

Tim Naftali author of Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism points out that the crisis in New Orleans has exposed the Dept. of Homeland Security:

How is it possible that with the fourth anniversary of 9/11 almost upon us, the federal government doesn't have in hand the capability to prepare for and then manage a large urban disaster, natural or man-made? In terms of the challenge to government, there is little difference between a terrorist attack that wounds many people and renders a significant portion of a city uninhabitable, and the fallout this week from the failure of one of New Orleans' major levees. Indeed, a terrorist could have chosen a levee for his target. Or a dirty-bomb attack in New Orleans could have caused the same sort of forced evacuation we are seeing and the widespread sickness that is likely to follow.

Chertoff's Department of Homeland Security demonstrated today that it could organize an impressive press conference in Washington, lining up every participating civilian or military service from the Coast Guard to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to promise its cooperation. But on the ground in Louisiana, where it counts, DHS is turning out to be the sum of its inefficient parts. The department looks like what its biggest critics predicted: a new level of bureaucracy grafted onto a collection of largely ineffectual under-agencies.

More Swazi Madness

First of all this report claims that there were only 20,000 topless reed dancers. Sure that's a pretty big number but it is not as clean a number as 50,000. You could fit 20,000 at the Triple AAA but you would need the Orange Bowl to host 50,000...it really is a big difference.

On to the madness - apparently the king's boozing daughter was beat with a cane. She ran afoul of regulations by hosting a wild drinking party. The gentleman who oversees traditional affairs punsihed her like everyone else.

Israel and Pakistan Make Nice

The Foreign Ministers of Israel and Pakistan got together in Istanbul. I would say it is encouraging but does Pervez and his government speak for anyone other than themselves. If they would disappear would this budding relationship bloom? I doubt it.

Setting the Standard

Let's face it most political mags are a drag. The Nation and Mother Jones are suffused with a suffocating earnestness that is completely offputting. TNR is smart but can be a drag, National Review is staid and Reason has not only become irrelevant it has adopted a hectoring tone. So where to go to have some fun? Why neo-con central of course - the Weekly Standard, which is celebrating 10 years in print. This is ironic because another magazine that started 10 years ago - the JFK Jr. vanity project, George, was supposed to be the irreverent one not the Rupert Murdoch production. George isn't around anymore but the Standard is still kicking.

The first piece has always been the hit or miss "Casual" column which rarely touches on politics and usually comments on the lighter aspects of life. The last thing on the mag is the more hit than miss "Parody" page, which is sometimes replaced by "Not a Parody" (my fav - a pic of Alan Keyes stage diving at a concert in Iowa). As the WaPost notes even better than the obvious lighter stuff on the ends is the stuff in between penned by Andrew Ferguson and Matt Labash. I'll be honest though and even though Ferguson and Labash are quite good Tucker Carlson was the best. Unfortunately Mr. Carlson has confused himself for a talking head and abandoned his true calling writing. Happy 10th Standard!

Mad Turks

The Turks are ticked off at celebrated Turk author Orhan Pamuk for mentioning the Armenian massacre of 1915 and the ongoing struggle with the PKK and the Kurds in an interview. Apparently you can't talk about this stuff because he is now facing jail time. If the Turks really want to join the EU this really isn't a good way to go about it.

Shanghai Surprise - More "Peace Missions"?

The Soviets...darn I did it again...I meant the Ruskies are so excited that they got to bring out their toys and play in the sand that they hope to have more military excercises with the other members of the Warsaw Pact...gosh darnit I meant Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This organization is composed of USSR and Red China...or for the politically correct - Russia, China(mainland) and four autocratic 'Tans (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan). India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia also have observer status in the SCO.

Election Watch Part II: Bye-Bye Schroeder (I Hope)

The WaPost weighs in on the "crucial election" in Germany and even they have to side with W once it comes to the slimy Schroeder. They note Schroeder's demagoguery but also notice that it is not working this time - Angie Merkel the CDU/CSU candidate still leads by a dozen points. As the editorial notes it would be best if Ms. Merkel can avoid forming a grand coalition the SDP in order to implement much needed reforms (including a flat tax!). Hopefully the FDP is able to pick up its numbers to form a coalition with the CDU/CSU.

Election Watch Part I: Hugo Helps Evo

The December election in Bolivia promises to be a critical one for the region. Chavez has done his part by hosting the leading lights of the loony left had them come to terms in order to create a united front . Evo is set to be the presidential candidate and Alvaro Garcia Linera, an associate of Evo's rival Felipe Quispe. Quispe runs another freak show called Pachakutec Indigenous Movement (MIP). Did I mention that the erstwhile VP candidate faces legal charges involving past activity with the terrorist Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK)? The moderate right is currently divided and fielding a number of candidates so it is possible for the extreme left to eek out a plurality.

The Son Also Rises in Egypt

He's an American favorite and a reputed reformist so how sure are we that Gamal Mubarak is not the next Bashir Asad? We're not. Gamal lived in London so everyone gets all giddy that he is going to bring about reform and maybe he will. It is important to note that the same high hopes surrounded fellow London resident Bashir Asad's ascencion in Syria and he has been nothing short of a colossal disappointment. If Gamal does assume power it would be difficult for him to reform a system that would deprive the very people who are his base of support. The hope is that Gamal, who appears to be much better prepared for being a head of state than Asad, could make the necessary changes to modernize Egypt's political and economic systems.

Bolton's Objections

As we mentioned literally a week ago our rep to the UN, John Bolton, raised a number of objections to proposed UN reforms. The WaPost is now giving more details on the letters (there are six apparently) sent UN delegates outlining American concerns. Among the issues raised were:

• An insistence that the UN Security Council already has sufficient authority to dispatch troops.
• "The deletion of language calling on nations to prevent 'incitement' of mass atrocities..." (it violates the First Amendment)
• "That the 'scope' of the terrorism provision should be limited to 'terrorist actions,' not 'military activities that are appropriately governed by international humanitarian law.'"
• Defer any discussion on a definition of terrorism to the General Assembly, which is negotiating a convention on terrorism.

Bolton responded to criticism that objections were raised late in the game by noting that the first suggestions were made on June 25. As I stated in the previous post if Amb. Bolton would have been focused on his job rather than his confirmation hearings then we would not be going through this now.

The UN Does Good in Lebanon

Some of you probably thought that I would never have anything nice to say about the UN, but here I am showing that I am in fact fair. The UN team investigating the murder of former Lebanese PM Rafik al-Hariri questioned 5 suspects and turned them over to Lebanese investigators. Not so surprisingly all 5 have close ties with Syria. According to WaPost the suspects were "a top aide to pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, three former security chiefs and a former member of parliament close to Damascus." The former MP, "staunch Syria ally Nassir Qandil", was eventually released. The Lebanese have 48 hours to decide if they want to press charges against the remaining 4 suspects.

Changes at Guantanamo

The US is tinkering with its military tribunal but critics insist that the changes are a little more than cosmetic or "tinkering around the edges."

A Draft is a Draft

The draft of the Iraqi constitution is just that - a draft. The US feels that this means that even thought the deadline has passed and a vote is already scheduled that there still could be changes in the proposed Iraqi Constitution. Will this never end?

Solidarnosc!

It was 25 years ago that the independent labor movement, Solidarity, was founded in Gdansk. Despite its humble beginnings the group would spearhead a revolution that would help shatter the Iron Curtain. openDemocracy.net recalls the history of Solidarity and how it brought down Communism and the WaPost's Anne Applebaum, who was based in Poland for a number of years, reflects on what Solidarity means to the Poles today.

Salman Rushdie Interview

Salman Rushdie graces the cover of this month's Reason Magazine. Inside there is a free-wheeling interview with author. I'm posting only some of his comments if you want to read the whole thing you can do so here.

Reason: Do you think freedom of speech is threatened by cultural relativism—by the idea that principles like free expression are not universal truths but simply local cultural constructs?

Rushdie: The idea of universal rights—the idea of rights that are universal to all people because they correspond to our natures as human beings, not to where we live or what our cultural background is—is an incredibly important one. This belief is being challenged by apostles of cultural relativism who refuse to accept that such rights exist. If you look at those who employ this idea, it turns out to be Robert Mugabe, the leaders of China, the leaders of Singapore, the Taliban, Ayatollah Khomeini. It is a dangerous belief that everything is relative and therefore these people should be allowed to kill because it’s their culture to kill.

I think we live in a bad age for the free speech argument. Many of us have internalized the censorship argument, which is that it is better to shut people up than to let them say things that we don’t like. This is a dangerous slippery slope, because people of good intentions and high principles can see censorship as a way of advancing their cause and not as a terrible mistake. Yet bad ideas don’t cease to exist by not being expressed. They fester and become more powerful.

Reason: The fatwa was in some ways a precursor to September 11. It was the clearest indication of the threat Islamic fundamentalism posed to freedom, pluralism, secularism, and everything we love about the West. You called on Western leaders at that time to unite to defeat the forces of tyranny and terrorism, the "witch-burners" as you called them, pointing out that this was not about religion but about domination and control. Did the West respond?

Rushdie: Pretty slowly. I think eventually it did. One of the things that was interesting was that on both sides of that argument there were people who wanted to describe this as an exceptional event. People who were on my side wished to say that this was an exceptionally horrible attack on a writer and therefore required exceptional resources to defend it. People who were not on my side said that I had done something so exceptionally horrible that the rules of free speech didn’t apply. But on both sides of the argument, there was a desire not to make it typical of anything. It didn’t prove that Islam was against free speech. It was just against this horrible abuse of it. It didn’t prove that there was a large problem of this sort. It just proved that a particularly insane dying religious leader had made a particularly insane fanatical threat.

And when I tried to say that this is not just me, that it is happening in a lot of places to a lot of writers and you need to look at that larger phenomenon, it was often seen as special pleading. This was seen as me trying to attach my case to others to justify myself. It was very difficult to get anyone to see that there was a growing phenomenon that needed to be taken seriously: the attempt to control thought.

This is at the front line of Islamic radicalism. There are all kinds of things that come behind it. You know what [Iranian sociologist] Ali Shariati called the "revolt against history." That’s the project of tyranny and unreason which wishes to freeze a certain view of Islamic culture in time and silence the progressive voices in the Muslim world calling for a free and prosperous future.

People weren’t interested in hearing about this at the time. And then along comes 9/11, and now many people say that, in hindsight, the fatwa was the prologue and this is the main event.

Reason: You wrote an essay criticizing President Bush and other Western leaders for claiming after 9/11 that "this is not about Islam." In what way is this about Islam?

Rushdie: Well, you know, that was said for good reasons. It was said to minimize the backlash against Muslims. But just in terms of actual fact, it is absurd. It is not about football.

The fact that it is about a particular idea of Islam that many Muslims would reject does not mean it is not about Islam. The Christian Coalition is still about Christianity, even if it’s an idea of Christianity that many Christians might not go along with.

Reason: What they mean is that it is not about Islam properly understood. That it is about certain extreme followers of Islam who might not be interpreting the religion correctly.

Rushdie: Yes, but Wahhabi Islam is becoming very powerful these days. To say that it is not about Islam is to not take the world as it really is.

Reason: If you were President’s Bush’s speechwriter, how would you do it?

Rushdie: You would just have to make that argument. You have to say, "Not everybody is like this, but this is a part of what there is." This is the problem with the truth. Truth is never one-dimensional. It is contradictory sometimes. But politics wants clarity.

My job is not to make a politician’s life easier. As for Bush’s speechwriters, I have met some of them, and they are very able people.

Reason: Where does this leave us on the question of democratic reform in Islamic countries? Do you think that Islam lacks a crucial piece to build a foundation for freedom?

Rushdie: What it has is an extra piece that believes that religion can be the foundation for a state. It’s a question of removing that piece rather than adding something. There have been various moments in the history of Pakistan when attempts to Islamize the country were resisted strongly by both generals and civilian governments. It’s not inevitable that a country full of Muslims will seek to Islamize its structures. But I do think there is a need for a widespread realization among Muslims that you cannot build a state based on religion. Pakistan is proof of that. Here was a state that was built on religion, but a quarter of a century after it was founded it fell apart, because the glue is not strong enough

Reason: Leftist intellectuals have typically viewed world politics as a struggle between the powerful West and the powerless Third World. For some, 9/11 changed this—one person who did a complete turnaround is your friend Christopher Hitchens, to whom Step Across This Line is dedicated, who has become an enthusiastic supporter of the Bush foreign policy. Arundhati Roy, the Indian writer and activist, continues to view America as the source of many of the problems in the world. Like her, you were a critic of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Which camp do you put yourself in now?

Rushdie: You can say that I’m the third point of the triangle. I find myself sometimes agreeing with both of them and often disagreeing with both of them. Christopher’s journey toward Wolfowitz is a lot further along than mine. And I don’t think that I am yet convinced of the theory of the democratic domino effect. Even though we see these stirrings in those countries in the area, I think you could easily attribute those stirrings to things quite independent of American policy, which have to do with local history. The hatred of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon has existed for a long time, and at some point that was going to burst out. If you look at the consequences of the death of Arafat, it seems to me that what’s happening in the Palestinian community right now has great echoes in Northern Ireland in the Catholic community. There comes a point when people get sick of that stuff, sick of violence and terrorism. Catholics in Northern Ireland simply grew to detest what the IRA was doing.

Of course American policy plays a role because it is so powerful. But many of the things that are happening there had local roots.

Reason: Nobody would quarrel with that, but the question is, can—and has—current U.S. foreign policy been a catalyst for positive change?

Rushdie: I think that’s an open question. The next decade will tell us the answer.

Reason: So do you or don’t you part company with critics of American power, like Roy?

Rushdie: I admire a lot of Arundhati’s activism and have written in support of her efforts to stop some of the big dam projects in India. She is an old-style leftist of the sort that there still are in India, and many of them are my friends. But I don’t see the world the way they do, with America as the bogeyman.

I wrote Shame [1983] when there were still two superpowers. One of the ideas of that novel was that it is very easy to blame the superpowers for the problems of, say, India and Pakistan. The premise was, let’s just assume that our problems are of our own making and then exacerbated by this or that superpower. At that point you get back responsibility for your own life. It puts the tools back in our own hands. It’s kind of infantilizing to say that everything comes from the outside.

Reason: When I was growing up in India, every communal riot, every instance of government corruption, every thing that went wrong was blamed by politicians on the "CIA Hand."

Rushdie: Everything. Everything was the Hidden Hand. The Pynchonesque conspiracy running the world.

Indonesia and US

Two stories in two days at CSM regarding Indonesia. The first details the delicate relationship between the US and Indonesia. Things have not been quite right since Indonesian troops laid East Timor to waste. Things are improving however and W is pushing for better relations. His enthusiasm may lay in part to Indonesia's successful fight against terror and the fact that it is the world's most populous Muslim state.

Going After MS-13

The WaPost is thrilled that Maryland is going after MS-13 by using RICO.

Sri Lankan PM Wants Peace

Sri Lankan PM and presidential candidate Mahinda Rajapakse wants peace so bad that he is willing to sit down with the leader of the group with coolest name every given to a murdering band of terrorists and assasins - the Tamil Tigers. Considering his party's current hardline stance this is surprising.

Shocking News From Egypt!

An NGO reports that the elections are rigged in favor of President Hosni Mubarak! The US is urging the inclusion of international monitors. I wouldn't bet that they will be invited.

50,000 Topless Women Dance for King

This was just too weird not to post. Needless to say there has been criticism of the king. All I have to say is if he was only wearing a loincloth where did he keep his singles?

Massacre at USAID Event

A "Play for Peace" soccer match in Haiti was marred by hooded police officers and machete wielding civilians attacking the spectators. At least six are dead.

"Top Ten Reasons to Undo Iraq"

Ivan Eland of the Independent Insitute thinks it's best to break up Iraq and get the heck out he gives us ten reasons. Eland also counts himself as a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy but as a libertarian is more isolationist than realist.

Don't Call it a Comeback - Part II

Unlike Chalabi I never had any doubt that Moqtada Sadr would be back. WaPost has a lengthy profile on his key aides who have recently been released from prison. CSM documents how Sadr is appealing to Sunnis by opposing the proposed Iraqi Constitution.

Don't Call it a Comeback - Part I

The WSJ fetes every neo-con's favorite Iraqi, Ahmed Chalabi, who is apparently not only still around but prospering. So maybe he has beat the charges against him in Iraq, but isn't he still a convicted criminal in Jordan?